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1
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE
This brief is filed on behalf of the undersigned
Law Professors identified in Appendix A.1
Amici are scholars at U.S. law schools whose
research and teaching focus is intellectual property
law, federal Indian law and constitutional law. Amici
have no direct interest in the outcome of this litigation. Amici are concerned that the Court of Appeals
decision below is inconsistent with the well settled
law that laches does not apply to trademark cancellation claims, including those based on disparagement,
because of the strong public interest in being free from
the harms that disparagement causes. These harms,
which include damaging stereotyping and stigmatization, are serious and deserve protection no matter
what private harm may be caused by delay to the
trademark registrant. Further, precluding laches in
these cases protects the government’s interest in assuring the integrity of the Trademark Register. Amici
urge this Court to grant review of this matter to
clarify that laches cannot apply to a disparagement
cancellation claim. Such a ruling will increase certainty for trademark holders, individuals and groups
1

The parties were timely notified of the intent to file this
amicus brief pursuant to Rule 37.2. Letters of the parties’
general consent to file are on file with the Court. This brief was
not authored in whole or in part by counsel for any party. No one
other than Amici and their counsel made a monetary contribution
to preparing or submitting this brief. Amici’s institutional affiliations are provided only for purposes of identification.
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claiming or subject to disparagement, and promote
the larger public interest inherent in these claims.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Disparagement claims belong in the category of
trademark cancellation claims that are not subject to
laches defenses because the harm to the public in the
continued registration of the mark outweighs any private harm that may be caused by the delay. This exception categorically precludes application of the
laches defense and does not require a balancing of the
equities that occurs in ordinary cases involving a
laches defense. Courts have recognized that the equitable defense is inapplicable in disputes in which
there is a public harm caused by the continued registration and enforcement of the mark.
Disparagement claims explicitly target the public
harms of perpetuating offensive stereotypes. If laches
defenses are barred in cancellation claims that only
implicitly protect the public, then that doctrine clearly extends to cancellation claims that explicitly protect the public from harm.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
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ARGUMENT
I.

Disparagement Claims Are Not Subject to
Laches Defenses

Disparagement claims belong in the category of
trademark cancellation claims that are not subject to
laches defenses because the harm to the public in the
continued registration of the mark outweighs any
private harm that may be caused by the delay. It is
settled law that laches, even if proven, will not defeat
numerous cancellation claims. 3 Thomas J. McCarthy,
McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition
§ 20:77 (4th ed. 2009); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp. v. Am. Meter Co., 153 U.S.P.Q. 419 (T.T.A.B. 1967)
(“The equitable principles of laches and estoppel are
inapplicable where the registration of a descriptive
term is involved.”); Philip Morris Inc. v. He-Man
Prods., Inc., 157 U.S.P.Q. 200 (T.T.A.B. 1968) (“[I]t is
a well established principle of trademark law that the
equitable defense of laches and estoppel is not available in a proceeding wherein, as here, the adverse
party is claiming that the designation in question
inherently cannot function as a trademark for the
goods in question under the trademark statute.”);
Am. Velcro, Inc. v. Charles Mayer Studios, Inc., 177
U.S.P.Q. 149 (T.T.A.B. 1973) (“While this testimony
might well conjure up the equitable defense of
estoppel and laches, it may be appropriate to point
out that these equitable defenses are not available to
a defendant in a proceeding wherein, as here, the
adverse party is claiming in essence that the mark in
question inherently cannot function as a trademark

4
under the statute . . . The rationale behind these
series of cases is that it is within the public interest
to have registrations which are void ab initio striken
from the register and that this interest or concern
cannot be voided by the inaction of any single person
or concern, no matter how long the delay persists.”);
Saint-Gobain Abrasives, Inc. v. Unova Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 1355, 1359 (T.T.A.B.
2003) (“It is well-established that the equitable
defenses of laches and acquiescence are not available
against claims of genericness, descriptiveness, fraud
and abandonment. . . . For the same reason, we hold
that where the proposed ground for opposition and
cancellation is functionality, the defenses of laches
and acquiescence are unavailable.”); Midwest Plastic
Fabricators, Inc. v. Underwriters Labs., Inc., 5
U.S.P.Q.2d 1067, 1069 (T.T.A.B. 1987) (“[T]he defense
of laches is not available where the petition to cancel
is based on a claim that a respondent has failed to
control the use of a certification mark, such that the
mark is being used to certify goods that do not
meet specified standards. . . . The public interest in
certification marks and the assurance that registered
certification marks are being properly controlled
outweighs any possible injury to the respondent
resulting from inaction by petitioner.”). As this
doctrine has developed in the courts, these claims
include: 1) the claim of inevitable confusion;2 2) the
2

See Chun King Corp. v. Genii Plant Line, Inc., 403 F.2d
274, 276 (C.C.P.A. 1968); Ultra-White Co. v. Johnson Chem.
(Continued on following page)
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claim that the mark is generic;3 3) the claim that the
registration was fraudulently obtained;4 4) the claim
that the mark has been abandoned;5 5) the claim that
6
the mark is functional; and 6) the claim of lack of
control over a certification mark.7 In each of the
cancellation claims to which this doctrine applies, any
injury to the registrant caused by the petitioner’s
delay in bringing the claim would be outweighed by
the anticipated injury to the public caused by the
continued registration of the mark.
These exceptions go beyond the ordinary balancing
of the equities that occurs in any case involving a laches
defense to categorically preclude application of the
doctrine. In cases in which these cancellation claims
Indus., Inc., 465 F.2d 891, 893-94 (C.C.P.A. 1972); Richdel, Inc.
v. Mathews Co., 190 U.S.P.Q. 37, 41 (T.T.A.B. 1976).
3
See Steinberg Bros., Inc. v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 156
U.S.P.Q. 574, 579-80 (T.T.A.B. 1967); Am. Velcro, Inc. v. Charles
Mayer Studios, Inc., 177 U.S.P.Q. 149, 156 (T.T.A.B. 1973); W.D.
Byron & Sons, Inc. v. Stein Bros. Mfg. Co., 146 U.S.P.Q. 313, 316
(T.T.A.B. 1965).
4
See Treadwell’s Drifters, Inc. v. Marshak, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d
1318 (T.T.A.B. 1990).
5
See Linville v. Rivard, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1731, n.5 (T.T.A.B.
1997), aff ’d on other grounds, 133 F.3d 1446 (Fed. Cir. 1998);
Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 213 F. Supp. 2d
247, 266-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
6
See Saint-Gobain Abrasives, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1359.
7
See Midwest Plastic Fabricators, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1069
(“The defense of laches is not available where the petition to
cancel is based on a claim that a respondent has failed to control
the use of a certification mark.”).
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are made, courts do not wade into an evaluation of
the public harm versus the private harm in the
application of a laches defense. Because of the nature
of the cancellation claim, the public harm will necessarily outweigh the private harm and laches cannot
therefore be asserted.
The interest of the public in being protected
against the registration of marks that would cause it
injury must forestall the application of this equitable
defense. Courts have recognized that the equitable
defense is inappropriate in disputes in which there is
a public harm in addition to the private injuries
asserted by the parties. Thus, in cases involving
marks that cause inevitable confusion in the
marketplace and certification marks that no longer
accurately certify a characteristic about a good or
service, not only would the private claimants be
injured, but the public would also be harmed by the
misleading information caused by the registered
mark. Likewise, in the cases of generic, functional,
abandoned and fraudulently obtained marks, not only
would the private claimants be injured, but the public
would also be injured by the barrier to competition
caused by the registered mark. Thus a number of
cancellation claims covered by this doctrine protect
the public by protecting consumers or by protecting
competition.
In this way, in each of the cancellation claims
where laches has been found not to apply, the courts
have identified a harm to the public that is in
addition to the harm to the private party that would

7
likely be caused by the continued registration of the
mark. In these cases, courts have held that the
equitable defense of laches was inapplicable due to
the additional presence of the public harm.8 The doctrine that emerges from these cases is that laches is
not available as a defense where there is a significant
public harm likely to result from the continued
registration of the mark.
If this exception to laches is to be maintained on
the basis of public harm, then cancellation claims of
disparagement must be brought within it. The
protection from disparaging marks is aimed principally at the public. In disparagement cancellation
proceedings, the public is not an additional beneficiary of the claim brought as a result of private
motivations, as is the case in the other claims that
have been held to preclude a laches defense.9 Instead,
8

See Chun King Corp. v. Genii Plant Line, Inc., 403 F.2d at
276; Ultra-White Co. v. Johnson Chem. Indus., Inc., 465 F.2d at
893-94; Richdel, Inc. v. Mathews Co., 190 U.S.P.Q. at 41; Steinberg Bros., Inc. v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 156 U.S.P.Q. at 579-80;
Am. Velcro, Inc. v. Charles Mayer Studios, Inc., 177 U.S.P.Q. at
156; W.D. Byron & Sons, Inc. v. Stein Bros. Mfg. Co., 146
U.S.P.Q. at 316; Treadwell’s Drifters, Inc. v. Marshak, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1318; Linville v. Rivard, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d at n.5;
Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 213 F. Supp. 2d at
266-67; Saint-Gobain Abrasives, 66 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1359; Midwest
Plastic Fabricators, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1069.
9
In only three disparagement cases was a private harm
even present. See Doughboy Indus., Inc. v. The Reese Chem. Co.,
88 U.S.P.Q. 227, 228 (1951) (holding the mark “Doughboy” when
used on prophylactic preparations for the prevention of venereal
disease may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with
(Continued on following page)
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in disparagement claims, the first and only objective
is to protect the public from harm.10 Unlike the
cancellation claims in which the courts analyzed and
articulated an additional public harm beyond the
private harm, in disparagement claims the public
harm is the only harm contemplated. Thus disparagement claims are the archetypical public interest
claims. If laches defenses are barred in cancellation
claims that implicitly protect the public, then that
doctrine clearly extends to cancellation claims that
explicitly protect the public.
American WWI soldiers); Greyhound Corp. v. Both Worlds, Inc.,
6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1635, 1639-41 (T.T.A.B. 1988) (finding the applicant’s defecating dog mark to be disparaging because the mark
would be considered generally offensive by a substantial portion
of the public and would be recognized by the public as referring
to the Greyhound Corp.); Boston Red Sox Baseball Club Ltd.
P’ship v. Brad Francis Sherman, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 67, 22-29
(T.T.A.B. 2008) (finding the applicant’s SEX ROD mark to be
disparaging because the mark would be perceived by a substantial composite of the public as vulgar and the public would
associate the offensive mark with the Boston Red Sox). In each
of these cases, a mark owner stood in to vindicate the public’s
right. Significantly, these cases were brought under a claim of
disparagement, in which the public’s sensibilities are at stake,
and not a claim of dilution by tarnishment, in which only the
mark owner’s sensibilities are relevant.
10
See Bromberg, et al. v. Carmel Self Serv., Inc., 198
U.S.P.Q. 176, 179 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (In finding that two female
opposers had standing to challenge the applicant’s “ONLY A
BREAST IN THE MOUTH IS BETTER THAN A LEG IN THE
HAND” mark on behalf of the female segment of the public, the
T.T.A.B. stated: “In the past, marks have been refused
registration by the examiner [under § 2(a)] on the ground that
they were offensive to a certain segment of the public.”).

9
Unlike cancellation claims of confusion, fraud,
abandonment, functionality, and genericism, which
occur with great frequency before the courts,11 dispar12
agement claims are rare. Only a few disparagement
claims have been litigated outside of the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board,13 and half have been ex parte
proceedings in which the United States Patent and
Trademark Office asserts the prohibition on behalf of
the public.14 Due to the dearth of disparagement cases
generally, it is not surprising that no court has yet

11

See 6 McCarthy on Trademarks § 31:60 (noting that
defendants in many trademark infringement suits pursue
claims of fraud); 3 McCarthy on Trademarks § 17:4 (explaining
that abandonment claims are significant in a number of legal
situations).
12
Only fourteen disparagement cases have been decided on
their merits. See In re Old Glory Condom Corp., 26 U.S.P.Q.
1216, 1221 n.4 (T.T.A.B. 1993) (noting existence of “little precedent on the meaning of ‘disparage’ in Section 2(a)”); 3 McCarthy
on Trademarks § 19:77.1 (“There is very little case law on what
constitutes a mark that disparage[s] a racial or ethnic group.”).
13
See Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir.
2009); Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
McDermott v. San Francisco Women’s Motorcycle Contingent, 240
Fed. Appx. 865 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
14
See, e.g., In re Anti-Communist World Freedom Cong.,
Inc., 161 U.S.P.Q. 304 (T.T.A.B. 1969); In re Condas, S.A., 188
U.S.P.Q. 544 (T.T.A.B. 1975); In re In Over Our Heads, Inc., 16
U.S.P.Q.2d 1653 (T.T.A.B. 1990); In re Hines, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1685
(T.T.A.B. 1994); In re Squaw Valley Dev. Co., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1264
(T.T.A.B. 2006); In re Heeb Media, LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1071
(T.T.A.B. 2008).
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held that the laches defense is inapplicable in cancellation petitions involving disparagement claims.15
The absence of precedent in no way undermines the
consistent application of the rule that laches does not
apply in cases involving public harms.
Not every case in which an argument can be
made that the public has an interest should be
included in this doctrine. Obviously the exception
would swallow the rule were courts to extend the
doctrine every time a claimant argued that they were
standing in on behalf of the public’s interest in an
efficient marketplace. In addition to the cancellation
claims set out above that have already been ruled to
be within this exception, the only other cancellation
claims that ought to be included are those that are
explicitly oriented to protecting the public.

15

Cancellation claims that marks are either scandalous or
immoral are also rarely litigated claims that should not be
subject to laches defenses because of the public’s interest in
prohibiting such marks. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). No court has yet
been asked to apply a laches defense to such a claim. Unlike
claims of disparagement, immorality and scandalousness, which
are all aimed at protecting the public, a claim that a mark
falsely causes a connection may address a private or public
harm depending on whether the false connection is made to an
individual or to a group. See In re White, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1645
(T.T.A.B. 2006) (refusing registration of MOHAWK for cigarettes
because it would falsely suggest a connection with the St. Regis
Band of Mohawk Indians of New York).

11
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act contains a number
of claims that may be asserted in a cancellation proceeding. All of the claims assert paramount public
interests that should preclude application of laches to
the claims. Among other things, this section prohibits
the registration of a mark that “consists of or comprises
immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter
which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection
with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or
national symbols, or bring them into contempt or
disrepute. . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). Each of these
claims addresses the public’s interest and should be
immune to laches defenses.
II.

Disparaging Marks Harm the Public

Protection against trademark disparagement has
been understood in various ways to prevent harm to
the public. The relevant concerns include protection
of a privacy interest, as in “the right to be ‘let alone’
from contempt and ridicule,”16 and the belief that
“group libel” is an actionable harm. See generally
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952). At its
core, the prohibition against registration of disparaging marks protects against the perpetuation of offensive stereotypes about a particular group. See In re
Hines, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1691 (holding that applicant’s
depiction of Buddha dressed in a bathing suit
16

See Greyhound Corp., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1639 (citing Carson
v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.
1983)).

12
sprawled across loungewear “slights, depreciates and
cheapens Buddha and Buddhism”); In re Heeb Media,
LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1073, 1077 (explaining that the
term “Heeb” is a derogatory term for a person of
Jewish descent and cannot be registered as a trademark because it offends a substantial composite of the
relevant group).
Although the legislative history of the enactment
of the disparagement claim under Section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act is scant, the present U.S. prohibition on
the registration of marks that harm the public
derives from the first major multilateral trademark
treaty in force in the late nineteenth century. The
authoritative Paris Convention in its first iteration in
1883 provided only one acceptable ground for the
refusal of trademark registrations, which was when a
mark was considered contrary to morality or public
order.17 A mark contrary to public order has been
defined as one that is contrary to basic legal or social
concepts.18 Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act mirrors
and implements the concern for morality and public
17

“[T]he only ground for refusal or invalidation of the
registration of trademarks covered by Article 6,” which set forth
the conditions of registration and the independence of registration of the same mark in different countries, was if “the object
for which it is requested is considered contrary to morality or
public order.” See G.H.C. Bodenhausen, Guide to the Application
of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
114 (1968) (citing Actes de Paris, I. pp.73-74, 138).
18
See id., at 116 (listing examples including a mark containing a religious symbol, the emblem of a forbidden political
party, or the emblem of a public body).

13
order in the Paris Convention,19 as it refuses to
permit or maintain the registration of marks that are
“immoral, deceptive, or scandalous” or which “may
disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions,
beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into
contempt or disrepute.” See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a).
While trademark law most often measures economic harms, the underlying notion in these categories of prohibited marks is to protect against the
perpetuation of unflattering stereotypes about a
particular group and the harms to both its members
and the public at large. As the T.T.A.B. found in this
case below, “there exists a broader interest – an
interest beyond the personal interest being asserted
by the present petitioners – in preventing a party
from receiving the benefits of registration where a
trial might show that respondent’s marks hold a
substantial segment of the population up to public
ridicule.”20 While the injury to the members of the
group is self-evident, the social costs to the public at
large may include reinforcing hateful and erroneous
stereotypes and misinformation about a certain group.
The harm is at once to the referenced group and also to
19

The United States is a signatory to the Paris Convention.
See Jasmine Abdel-khalik, To Live in In-“fame”-y: Reconceiving
Scandalous Marks as Analogous to Famous Marks, 25 Cardozo
Arts & Ent. L.J. 173, 186 (2007) (noting that Congress examined
foreign trademark laws before passing the 1905 Act and suggesting
Congress was significantly influenced by international registration
regimes).
20
Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc., 30 U.S.P.Q.2d 1828, 1830
(T.T.A.B. 1994).

14
society as a whole. See In re Heeb Media, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d
at 1074.
The effects of trademarks are not limited to their
role to “identify and distinguish” goods or services,
but importantly they have unique power to shape,
reflect, and comment upon social identities.21 In this
way, disparaging marks, with their power to stigmatize a group or individual, pose a serious threat to the
larger common good for both stigmatized groups
and society as a whole. The term “stigma” itself refers
to a mark placed on an individual to signify infamy or
disgrace.22 Those associated with stigmas are not
viewed as normal, but different, flawed, or undesirable.23 The public as a whole suffers from stigmatizing individuals or groups, as the public typically
constructs a false ideology to explain the stigmatized
group’s inferiority and rationalize society’s animosity toward it.24 Studies demonstrate that “bias can
be exacerbated or mitigated by the information
environments we inhabit,” and that “consuming negative images can exacerbate implicit bias.”25

21

See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity:
Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 397, 397 (1990).
22
James Flynn et al., Risk, Media, and Stigma 3 (2001).
23
See id., at 14.
24
Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of
Spoiled Identity 5-6 (1986).
25
Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 Harv. L.Rev. 1490,
1557, 1561 (2005).
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III. Disparaging Marks Harm the Government’s Interest in Protecting the Integrity
of the Register of Trademarks
The prohibition on registering and maintaining
disparaging marks also has been found to further the
government’s interest in protecting the integrity of
the Register of Trademarks. Courts are mindful that
trademark registration confers distinct legal advantages over common-law marks, including “prima facie
evidence” of validity in subsequent cancellation
proceedings.26 To protect the public from confusion
over the source of goods, it is crucial to determine the
validity of trademarks listed on the Federal Register
to ensure that these benefits are not granted improperly.27 Moreover, the federal government should not
waste its valuable resources on protecting invalid
marks.28 The government should also not provide
its imprimatur through federal registration of marks
that are void ab initio, such as those found to be
26

3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §19:9.
In evaluating the validity of a disputed trademark, courts
must consider that the “interests [of the public] are paramount”
in this calculus. 1 McCarthy on Trademarks § 2:33 n.5 (citing
James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266,
274 (7th Cir. 1976)). See Nestle Co., Inc. v. Chester’s Market, Inc.,
596 F. Supp. 1445, 1454 (D. Conn. 1984) (explaining that “protection of the public is a primary goal” of the regulatory framework).
28
See Dwinell-Wright Co. v. Nat’l Fruit Product Co., Inc.,
129 F.2d 848, 853 (1st Cir. 1942) (explaining that there is a
“waste and duplication of effort” associated with repeated litigation over the same issue.).
27
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disparaging.29 This is particularly true here where the
government has an interest in preventing its instrumentalities from being used to perpetuate and enforce
offensive stereotypes.30 Safeguarding the integrity of
the Trademark Register is an important public policy
goal that has been vindicated in judicial decisions
along with the injury to parties challenging a
registered trademark.31
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------29

See In re McGinley, 660 F.2d 481, 486 (C.C.P.A. 1981)
(“We do not see . . . [the refusal to register such marks] as an
attempt to legislate morality, but, rather, a judgment by the
Congress that such marks not occupy the time, services, and use
of funds of the federal government.”).
30
See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (“[w]hen the
effect of . . . [government] action is to deny rights subject to the
protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is the obligation of
this Court to enforce the constitutional commands.”).
31
Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 194 (3d Cir. 2001);
(“[T]he interest vindicated by Section 14 is not just the injury to
the challenging party, but the integrity of the register.”); Harjo,
30 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1831 (“The Board has held that the equitable
defenses of laches and estoppel are not available against claims
of fraud and abandonment because there exists a broader interest – a ‘public policy’ interest – in addition to a private interest in removing from the register those registrations procured
or maintained by fraud and those registrations for marks that
have been abandoned.”); TBC Corp. v. Grand Prix Ltd., 12
U.S.P.Q.2d 1311, 1313 (T.T.A.B. 1989) (“Where the proposed
ground for cancellation is abandonment, equitable defenses
should be unavailable for the same reason they have been held
unavailable when the ground asserted is descriptiveness or
fraud. It is in the public interest to remove abandoned registrations from the register.”).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should
grant review of this matter to clarify that the doctrine
of laches is inapplicable to trademark cancellation
petitions where there is a public harm caused by
continued registration of the mark.
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